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I. INTRODUCTION
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)' is
perhaps America's most debated statute. RICO allows the government
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1. 18 U.S.C §§ 1961-1964 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
2. Since 1998 over 400 law review articles and journals mention RICO. Search
to prosecute in both criminal and civil proceedings.! A private party
may also sue under the civil provisions of the statute.4 This Act has
received vast amounts of attention; in fact, RICO is perhaps the most
highly scrutinized piece of legislation that Congress has passed.5
RICO's criminal provisions are celebrated as an effective piece of
legislature that has accomplished its goal.
Quite a different story are the civil provisions of RICO which, in
recent years, have troubled a number of courts. The same quality that
makes the criminal application of RICO so successful-namely RICO's
far-reaching application-makes civil RICO quite troublesome. Critics
have cried for reform for nearly two decades. However, their pleas have
remained unanswered.6 As interpretations of RICO continue to grow,
new applications, and new conflicts, are continually arising.
Nontraditional use of civil RICO is becoming increasingly prevalent,
and even family law has been introduced to civil RICO.
7
Within the field of family law, civil RICO is making an appearance in
the aftermath of divorce cases. This statute appeals to both litigants and
lawyers because of its generous civil provisions.8 Money is the
motivating factor behind the use of civil RICO. Therefore, a vengeful
ex-spouse, and his9 lawyer, have much to gain from pursuing RICO
allegations.
RICO is but one tool that creative lawyers may use to sanction an ex-
spouse for torts committed during the marriage. With the abandonment
of the interspousal immunity doctrine,'0 husbands and wives are free to
sue each other for tortious conduct that occurred during marriage.
Increasingly, tort claims are added to claims of divorce to further
of WESTLAW, Journals & Law Reviews Combined (Apr. 12,2000).
3. This is commonly referred to as criminal RICO.
4. This component of RICO is referred to as civil RICO. For a complete
discussion of RICO, see generally DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF CIvIL RICO
(1991).
5. See id. at 12-13.
6. See generally Michael Goldsmith & Mark Jay Linderman, Civil RICO Reform:
The Gatekeeper Concept, 43 VAND. L. REv 735 (1990) (discussing abuse of civil RICO
and suggesting a method of reform).
7. RICO is such a popular statute that one district judge commented: "Would any
self-respecting plaintiffs' lawyer omit a RICO charge these days?" Papagiannis v.
Pontikis, 108 F.R.D. 177, 179 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (Supp. IV 1998) (awarding treble damages, costs, and
attorneys' fees).
9. This Comment uses the masculine pronoun for simplicity; there is no gender
bias intended.
10. Interspousal tort immunity is a doctrine that prohibits husbands and wives
from suing one another for personal injuries. The doctrine developed during the 1820s
and has become a minority rule since 1970. See Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity
in America, 23 GA. L. REv. 359 (1989) (providing a complete discussion of the erosion
of the doctrine in America).
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litigation as the marriage dissolves.1 The number of physical and
psychological spousal abuse claims is on the rise. 2  To accommodate
this trend, family lawyers must be increasingly aware of the potential for
such tort claims, or risk malpractice.
The majority of marital torts, an estimated seventy-five percent, stems
from assault and battery cases.'3 However, a bitter ex-spouse may also
recoup the cost of his mental anguish by suing his former lover for
intentional or even negligent infliction of mental distress.' 4  Perhaps
splitting spouses feel that only a large settlement will right the wrongs
inflicted upon them.' 5 Innovative lawyers have also litigated divorce
cases based upon claims such as fraudulent inducement to marry,
tortious transmission of venereal disease, false imprisonment,
wiretapping, child-napping, fraudulent dissipation of marital assets,
fraud, and even conspiracy. 6 The borders of this new area of law are
beginning to define themselves and a new frontier is emerging within the
divorce battlefield.
11. See William C. Smith, See You in Divorce Tort: Splitting Spouses Raise RICO,
Fraud and Other Claims, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1999, at 30.
12. See Leonard Karp, Spousal Infliction of Emotional Distress... Beyond the
Normal Ebb and Flow of Married Life, 12 J. AM. AcAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 309, 310
(1994).
13. See Smith, supra note 11, at 31. This estimation was made by the former
committee chair of the Marital Torts Committee of the A.B.A.'s Family Law Section,
Robert G. Spector. See id.
14. See Doe v. Doe, 712 A.2d 132 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998). In this case a
husband filed a complaint against his wife for divorce alleging, among other things,
intentional infliction of emotional distress. See id. at 135. The lower court dismissed
the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress for failure to state a claim on
policy grounds. See id. at 137. The appellate court reversed the lower court decision,
finding that given the abrogation of the interspousal immunity doctrine, public policy did
not prevent the husband from bringing forth his claim. See id. at 139; see also
McPherson v. McPherson, 712 A.2d 1043, 1045 (Me. 1998) (holding that a cause of
action exists for negligent transmission of sexually transmitted disease); Bland v. Hill,
735 So. 2d 414 (Miss. 1999). In Bland, a former husband filed a complaint against his
ex-wife's new husband for loss of affections of his wife, and for negligent and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. See id. at 415. The court declined to abolish
the tort of alienation of affections on the ground that to do otherwise would send out the
message that they were "devaluing the marriage relationship." Id. at 418.
15. For a more detailed look at this phenomenon, see generally Ira Mark Ellman &
Stephen D. Sugarman, Spousal Emotional Abuse as a Tort?, 55 MD. L. REV. 1268
(1996); Bradley A. Case, Note, Turning Marital Misery into Financial Fortune:
Assertion of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims by Divorcing Spouses,
33 U. LOuisviLLE J. FAM. L. 101 (1994-1995).
16. See Smith, supra note 11, at 31 (listing claims that spouses frequently allege
during divorce proceedings).
One case illustrates RICO's appearance in the divorce arena
particularly well. This case is the only civil RICO case to date that has
overcome the hurdle of summary judgment motions. The bitter irony of
this case is particularly apparent because the named defendant is a
prominent divorce attorney. 7 In Perlberger v. Perlberger,"8 a wife
brought civil RICO charges against her former husband. Messody
Perlberger alleged that her ex-husband misrepresented his true income,
by means of a fraudulent scheme, to both her and the court during
divorce proceedings. 9 The alleged scheme was devised by Mr.
Perlberger to hide his true income during divorce proceedings." While
he was still married he became involved with a client he represented in a
divorce action. As their relationship developed, Mr. Perlberger moved
in with Ms. Strausser and filed for divorce. With the help of his new
girlfriend, Mr. Perlberger was allegedly able to maintain his "lavish
lifestyle" while representing a diminished personal income.2
Mr. Perlberger allegedly coerced his accountants? to fraudulentl
misrepresent his true assets in exchange for a large sum of money.
When Mr. Perlberger's relationship with his first girlfriend ended, a new
woman replaced her, both as a girlfriend and as his means to hide his
true income.2' Defendant Rothenberg, an attorney, allegedly assisted
Perlberger by "holding" cases for him that had ample settlement value. 6
Also named in the lawsuit was Mr. Perlberger's law firm, the attorney
defendants." This fraudulent scheme was perpetuated by conversations
on the telephone and by mail.& Due to these transactions, Mrs.
Perlberger was able to bring suit under RICO for violations of 18 U.S.C.
17. See id. at 30.
18. To date, this case has generated two published orders and four unpublished
memoranda. See Perlberger v. Perlberger (Perlberger 1), No. CIV.A.97-4105, 1997 WL
597955 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1997); Perlberger v. Perlberger (Perlberger I), No.
CIV.A.97-4105, 1998 WL 76310 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 1998); Perlberger v. Perlberger
(Perlberger I1), No. CIV.A.97-4105, 1998 WL 964182 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 1998);
Perlberger v. Perlberger (Perlberger IV), 32 F. Supp. 2d 197 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Perlberger
v. Perlberger (Perlberger IV), 34 F. Supp. 2d 282 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Perlberger v
Perlberger (Perlberger VI), No. CIV.A.97-4105, 1999 WL 79503 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12,
1999).
19. See Perlberger I, 1997 WL 597955, at *1.
20. See Perlberger II, 1998 WL 76310, at *1.
21. See id. at *2.
22. Id. at *3.
23. Perlberger's accountants were also named as defendants in the action. See
Perlberger, 1997 WL 597955, at *1.
24. See id. at*1-2.
25. See Perlberger II, 1998 WL76310, at *3.
26. See id. This had the effect of sheltering Mr. Perlberger's assets.
27. See Perlberger v. Perlberger (Periberger VI), No. CIV.A.97-4105, 1999 WL
79503, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 1999).
28. See id.
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§§ 1341 and 1343, predicate acts under RICO 2
As a result of Mr. Perlberger's action, Mrs. Periberger and her two
children were allegedly awarded much smaller sums of child support and
alimony. In fact, she asserted that his income was misrepresented by
more than half." Though the court granted summary judgment in favor
of the accountant defendants,3 defendant Rothenberg, and defendant
Brennen,32 Mrs. Perlberger's case has survived motions by the remaining
attorney defendants for summary judgment.3 Time will tell if Mrs.
Perlberger's allegations pass the test of litigation.
This case represents a small, but growing, handful of cases that are
using civil RICO in the divorce context.4  Though no ex-spouse has
prevailed on the merits for RICO violation to date, the possibility of
treble damages and attorneys' fees assures that we have not seen the end
of RICO accusations in this context.35 This use of RICO is an innovative
29. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1994) (defining "racketeering activity").
30. See Perlberger v. Perlberger (Perlberger 1), No. CIV.A.97-4105, 1997 WL
597955, at *1 (granting motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted in part and granting leave to amend complaint).
31. See Perlberger v. Perlberger (Perlberger IV), 32 F. Supp. 2d 197,210 (E.D. Pa.
1998), vacated in part, modified in part by Perlberger v. Perlberger (Perlberger V), 34 F.
Supp. 2d 282 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (finding that non-lawyer parent Mrs. Perlberger cannot
represent child as pro se litigant; motion to dismiss vacated as it pertains to minor child
Laura E. Perlberger).
32. See Perlberger v. Perlberger (Perlberger III), No. CIV.A.97-4105, 1998 WL
964182, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 1998), vacated in part, modified in part by Perlberger v.
Perlberger (Perlberger V), 34 F. Supp. 2d 282 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (vacating motion to
dismiss as it pertained to minor child Laura E. Perlberger).
33. See Perlberger v. Perlberger (Perlberger II), No. CIV.A.97-4105, 1998 WL
76310, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 1998) (holding that plaintiffs alleged a distinct
enterprise); Perlberger v. Perlberger (Perlberger V1), No. CIV.A. 97-4105, 1999 WL
79503, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 1999). In Perlberger VI, the attorney defendants again
alleged that "there is no separateness between Norman Perlberger and his law firm" and
therefore there is no RICO violation. Id. The court rejected this logic for the second
time. See id. at *3.
34. See Smith v. Johnston, 173 F.3d 430, No. 98-1034, 1999 WL 137619 (6th Cir.
Mar. 5, 1999) (unpublished table decision); DeMauro v. DeMauro, 115 F.3d 94 (1st Cir.
1997); Grimmett v. Brown, 75 F.3d 506 (9th Cir. 1996); Calcasieu Marine Nat'l Bank v.
Grant, 943 F.2d 1453 (5th Cir. 1991); Evans v. Dale, 896 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1990);
DuBroff v. DuBroff, 833 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1987); Dibbs v. Gonsalves, 921 F. Supp. 44
(D.P.R 1996); Reynolds v. Condon, 908 F. Supp. 1494 (N.D. Iowa 1995); Streck v.
Peters, 855 F. Supp. 1156 (D. Haw. 1994); Hibbard v. Benjamin, CIV.A.90-1-361-WF,
1992 WL 300838 (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 1992); Capasso v. Cigna Ins. Co., 765 F. Supp.
839 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The failure of each case to withstand summary judgment motions
is discussed infra Part III.B.
35. The statute states in part: "Any person injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate
Civil RICO in Divorce[VOL. 37: 541, 2000]
application of a popular statute, and it will not be long before an ex-
spouse prevails on a RICO theory of liability.
This Comment analyzes the validity of civil RICO claims used in the
divorce context. With RICO's turbulent history, it is not surprising that
this popular litigation tool is popping up in an arena worlds away from
its original purposes. Part II of this Comment reviews RICO's
legislative history, the statutory construction, and the continual
expansion of the statute by the courts. Part I analyzes nontraditional
uses of RICO, specifically attempts to use RICO in the divorce context
and the shortcomings of each attempt. Part IV concludes with a
determination that divorce is a legitimate use of civil RICO. Given the
broad construction of RICO, the courts' refusal to limit RICO's
application, and Congress's failure to revise the statute, this Comment
argues that civil RICO is a proper tool for family lawyers to employ on
the divorce battlefield.
II. AN UNDERSTANDING OF RICO
The legislative history of RICO illustrates that Congress intended to
create a broad statute that would effectively destroy organized crime.
However, RICO was never intended to be used in other arenas. Given
Congress's goal to create such a powerful statute, RICO was written to
include a broad class of plaintiffs and defendants. Furthermore, judicial
interpretation has gone even farther to broaden the scope of RICO.
A. Legislative History
From 1967 through 1970 Congress discussed creating a tool with a
broad enough scope to eradicate the mob, hitting them where it hurt
most-their wallets." Congress was responding to a growing public
concern about organized crime. The public's fears were validated in
1950, when the Kefauver Committee noted the increasing problem of
encroachment of lawful business by organized crime. In 1967, in
United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the
cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (Supp. IV
1998).
36. See PAUL A. BATiSTA, CrVL RICO PRACTICE MANUAL 18 (1987). For a
complete look at RICO's legislative history, see Harper v. New Japan Securities
International, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002 (C.D. Cal. 1982). In response to confusion among
the circuits regarding the injury element of RICO, the court in Harper analyzed the
efforts of the 90th and 91st Congresses. See id. at 1005.
37. See S. REP. No. 81-2370, at 16 (1950). The Kefauver Committee was the first
national group to investigate the dilemma of Mafia invasion in America. See Brian J.
Murray, Protesters, Extortion, and Coercion: Preventing RICO from Chilling First
Amendment Freedoms, 75 NoTREDAMEL. REv. 691, 696 (1990).
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response to issues highlighted by the Kefauver Committee, a presidential
committee recommended that regulatory measures be implemented to
control organized crime infiltration into legitimate businesses." The
90th Congress proposed two bills to provide relief for the government
and third parties for injuries to legitimate business by organized crime. 9
The 91st Congress continued to work on creating a statute that would
eradicate Mafia infiltration.40 Its goal was realized in 1970 when the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act was enacted as
Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act.4' While the Organized
Crime Control Act was intended as a complete attack on organized
crime, RICO's specific role was to eliminate the mob's invasion of legal
businesses.42
Congress was aware that focusing the bill on one group of citizens,
specifically mobsters of Italian decent, could create constitutional
problems.43 To achieve the goal of targeting organized crime, the statute
is broadly construed to focus on predicate acts that establish a "pattern of
racketeering." Another way Congress strengthened RICO was by
providing both civil and criminal provisions.45 In frequently cited
language, the Senate Report that accompanied RICO broadly stated that
the purpose of the act was "the elimination of the infiltration of
organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating
38. See Harper, 545 F. Supp. at 1004-05 (discussing PRESIDENT'S COMUSSION OF
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A
FREE SOCIETY 190, 208 (1967)).
39. See id. at 1005 (discussing S. 2048, 90th Cong. (1967), a proposed amendment
to the Sherman Act, and S. 2049, 90th Cong. (1967), which mimicked the Sherman Act
but was separate from it.
40. For a complete discussion of action the 91st Congress took in creating the bill
which became RICO, see Harper, 545 F. Supp. at 1005.
41. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)). For a
complete look at RICO see, for example, HON. JED S. RAKOFF & HOWARD W.
GOLDSTEIN, RICO CIvI. AND CRIMINAL LAW AND STRATEGY (Eric H. Queen ed., 1999),
which analyzes the statute and provides an in depth look at important cases that have
used RICO.
42. See RAKOFF & GOLDSTEN, supra note 41, at 1-4.
43. For a review of constitutional problems associated with suspect classifications,
see generally GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 495-743 (1996).
44. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1964 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Racketeering activity
consists of the completion of two or more predicate acts listed in section 1961(1). See 18
U.S.C. § 1961(5).
45. Criminal penalties are discussed in 18 U.S.C. § 1963, while civil remedies are
explained in section 1964. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963, 1964 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
in interstate commerce."' This statement has been interpreted by
litigators to mean that Congress envisioned civil RICO being used in a
wide variety of situations.47 Without clearly specifying the scope of the
civil provisions, Congress created a tool that would strike a deadly blow
against the Mafia.48
What makes RICO such an appealing statute are the civil provisions,
which allow a plaintiff to receive both treble damages and attorneys'
fees.49 It is interesting that the very provisions that make RICO the
subject of numerous civil suits were not intended to have this dramatic
effect. Since Congress did not anticipate the effect of these provisions, it
did nothing to "curtail the predictable expansion of civil litigation
associated with the creation of a private treble-damages remedy.' One
member of the House Committee on the Judiciary for the 91st Congress
felt that the severity of the financial consequence that would follow any
racketeering activity intensified the power of the statute.51 This lack of
foresight about the potential scope of the civil provisions has led to a
great overuse of the civil provisions of RICO, with nothing to stop the
reach of the statute.
Due to the timing of the bill, RICO was passed in an expedited
manner, with perhaps a less than thorough review of the terms. With
the lucrative civil provisions, the intentional broadness of the statute,
and no measures to curtail the potential scope, it is no surprise that
RICO is straying far from its original aim.53
46. COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE, ORGANIZED CRIME
CONTROL AcT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 91-617, at 76 (1969). Congress discussed the
advantages of civil RICO, such as a lessened standard of proof and less stringent
discovery procedures. See id. at 82-83.
47. See BATISTA, supra note 36, at 17.
48. See 116 CONG. REC. 602 (1970) (statement of Sen. Hruska).
49. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (Supp. IV 1998).
50. BATISTA, supra note 36, at 18.
51. See Organized Crime Control: Hearings on S. 30 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 543-44 (1970) (statement of Edward L.
Wright, President-Elect of the American Bar Association).
52. With the national elections only a month away and the congressional session
almost over, the Senate did not seek conference before accepting the bill as proposed.
See ABRAMS, supra note 4, at 32. Immediately after this acceptance, the House passed
and adopted the bill. See id. Three days later, President Nixon signed the bill bringing
RICO to life. See id.
53. The "Statement of Findings and Purpose" of RICO states:
It is the purpose of [RICO] to seek the eradication of organized crime in
the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering
process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced
sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those
engaged in organized crime.
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923.
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B. Statutory Integrity of RICO
To completely comprehend the force given to RICO, it is necessary to
analyze the various components of the statute. RICO is located in 18
U.S.C. § 1961 through § 1968.4 Section 1961 defines the terms used in
the statute, and offers basic definitions for most of the elements.5
Section 1962 describes four types of prohibited conduct in subsections
(a), (b), (c), and (d). The requisite conduct includes: (a) using or
investing income received from a pattern of racketeering activity to
acquire an interest in any enterprise that is engaged in, or affects,
interstate commerce; (b) acquiring or maintaining through a pattern of
racketeering activity any interest in an enterprise that is engaged in, or
affects, interstate commerce; (c) conducting or participating in the
conduct, through a pattern of racketeering activity, of an enterprise that
is engaged in, or affects, interstate commerce; and (d) conspiring to
violate sections (a), (b), and (c) of this section."6 A RICO violation can
be based on the occurrence of any one of these four prohibited
activities.57
To show a RICO violation, a plaintiff must allege that it endured "(1)
injury in its business or property because the defendant, (2) while
involved in one or more enumerated relationships with an enterprise, (3)
engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity or collected an unlawful
debt."58  Once all of the elements are proven, 18 U.S.C. § 1964
prescribes sanctions including treble damages and attorneys' fees. 59
The first prong of a civil RICO violation is located at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964(c), which requires some injury to either a business or property.6°
This section is written in the disjunctive, which means plaintiffs may
show an injury either to their business or to their property. Within the
statute, a "'person' includes any individual or entity capable of holding a
legal or beneficial interest in property.' The class of potential plaintiffs
is therefore broad.
54. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
55. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). However, court interpretation
has supplemented the definitions to clarify the brief statements in 18 U.S.C. § 1961.
This will be discussed infra Part II.C.
56. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (1994).
57. See id.
58. ABRAMS, supra note 4, at 17 (explaining 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (Supp. IV 1998).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1994).
RICO requires that the defendant has invested in, participated in, or
maintained an interest in an enterprise." The definition of enterprise
includes both "legal entit[ies]" and "associat[ions] in fact,"'3 which
makes the class of potential defendants equally broad.6 According to
the statute, an enterprise "includes any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.' A RICO
violation is based on a number of federal or state crimes, deemed
predicate acts by the statute.66 Once the predicate acts are proven, they
must somehow further an enterprise.67
To sustain the enterprise relationship, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 requires proof
that the defendant committed a "pattern of racketeering activity" or
"collect[ed] ... unlawful debt."" A pattern of racketeering activity is
much easier to prove, which means that most civil RICO claims assert a
pattern rather than a collection of an unlawful debt.69  Racketeering
activity is described by the statute to consist of the commission of two or
more predicate acts listed in section 1961(1) within a ten-year period.0
RICO bases federal jurisdiction on the requirement that the enterprise
engages in or affects interstate commerce." Since Congress has
exclusive control over the regulation of interstate commerce,7 the
requirement that the illicit act implicate commerce gives the federal
government exclusive control over RICO violations.
C. Judicial Interpretation of RJCO
Despite generous civil provisions, civil RICO was not often used
62. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1994).
64. The true scope of the enterprise requirement is clarified in United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), and National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler,
510 U.S. 249 (1994), discussed infra Part II.C.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
66. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1962 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
67. See id.
68. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994); see § 1961(5), (6) (1994) (defining "pattern of
racketeering activity" and "unlawful debt").
69. See ABRAMS, supra note 4, at 21-22. The pattern element is much broader and
therefore easier to prove. See id.
70. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1994). The predicate criminal acts are defined as
acts "indictable" or "punishable" under a variety of federal laws, and acts "chargeable"
under numerous state laws. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (Supp. IV 1998). The section lists
specific crimes as well as more general criminal laws (e.g., all state felonies "involving
murder"). Id Though this section lists a variety of offenses, the most commonly plead
predicate acts are mail and wire fraud, and fraud in the sale of securities. See BATISTA,
supra note 36, at 13.
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1994).
72. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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during the first ten years of its creation. During this time, the vast
number of RICO cases tried were criminal prosecutions brought by the
Department of Justice.74 However, in 1980 the number of civil RICO
cases increased dramatically. They have been on the rise ever since,
with the majority of cases targeting "garden variety" business frauds.
Lower courts' attempts to limit the application of the Act have had
little success.76 Though ultimately futile, lower courts and litigators have
required: the enterprise to be a legitimate business; an organized crime
element;7 8 a competitive injury;79 that the defendant has been convicted
of a prior predicate act; 0 racketeering activity;8 and proof of an
economic motive.' As the lower courts imposed restrictions on civil
RICO, the Supreme Court continued to broaden its scope to the extent
that none of these restrictions remain in force today.
73. For a discussion of the growth of civil RICO cases in this era, see BATISTA,
supra note 36, at 4-6 (discussing the variety of claims asserted in this time period); see
also ABRAMS, supra note 4, at 1-10 (discussing the possible causes of the explosion in
the number of cases and judicial reaction to the deluge).
74. See Christopher W. Madel, The Modem RICO Enterprise: The Inoperation
and Mismanagement of Reves v. Ernst & Young, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1133, 1136 (1997).
75. See BATISTA, supra note 36, at 4; see also ABRAMS, supra note 4, at 4
(commenting that the first time the Supreme Court addressed civil RICO was 15 years
after its creation in the decision Sedima, S.P.R.L v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985)).
According to the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of the ABA Section of Corporation,
Banking, and Business Law of the American Bar Association, 40% of the cases involved
allegations of securities fraud and 37% alleged common law fraud in a commercial or
business setting, while only 4% were antitrust or unfair competition and bribery. See id.
at 5-6 (discussing ABA Task Force Report).
76. See Audra K. Hamilton, Note, RICO, the Unexpected Protector Unveiled in
National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 48 ARK. L. REV. 851, 865-66
(1995) (discussing the major attempts of district courts to limit the scope of civil RICO).
77. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 590 (1981) (abolishing the
requirement of lower courts that the "enterprise" operate in a legitimate capacity). This
aspect will be further discussed infra Part II.C.1.
78. See Saine v. A.I.A., Inc., 582 F. Supp. 1299, 1308 (D. Colo. 1984) (requiring
that the act in question be associated with organized crime).
79. See, e.g., North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207,211 (N.D.
Ill. 1980) (dismissing RICO allegations for failure to show how alleged violations
injured plaintiff's property or business); Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp.
1235, 1241-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (dismissing RICO allegations because the creditor had
not been damaged "by reason" of the RICO violation).
80. See Sedima, S.P.R.L v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 487 (2nd Cir. 1984), rev'd,
473 U.S. 479 (1985).
81. See id.
82. See United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 60 (2d Cir. 1983). This requirement
was abolished in National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 262
(1994).
An understanding of RICO's current application is best learned
through a look at judicial interpretation. Courts have affected the growth
of RICO in several categories: the enterprise requirement, the pattern of
racketeering activity, and abstention. Though courts have struggled with
the far-reaching impact of RICO, Congress has ignored the plea for
reform.
1. Enterprise
One of the elements of RICO that lower courts attempted to limit was
the enterprise prong. For a RICO claim to be successful, the statute
requires that the defendant participated in an enterprise.83 The definition
of enterprise has been supplemented and further clarified by judicial
interpretation. One major case that affected how plaintiffs may assert
RICO violations is United States v. Turkette.Y In this case, the U.S.
Supreme Court adopted an expansive interpretation of the criminal
RICO statute.
In Turkette, the defendant was charged with the commission of crimes
associated with the distribution of narcotics as well as several counts of
insurance fraud."6 This pattern of activity was committed by the
defendant and twelve others, satisfying the requirement of an
enterprise. 7 The defendant argued that RICO was designed to protect
legitimate businesses, and that because his criminal activities did not
attempt to infiltrate any legitimate business there was no RICO
violation."
The Court did not agree with this limited interpretation of RICO. 9
Though the Court acknowledged that the original intent of the drafters
was to combat infiltration of legitimate enterprises by organized crime,
the majority felt that this did not prevent RICO from applying when the
enterprise was illegal. ° The Court stated that any other reading of the
83. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994). This section prohibits a defendant from
engaging in a "pattern of racketeering activity" or the "collection of an unlawful debt"
while the defendant is involved in an "enterprise." Id. Enterprise is defined as
"includ[ing] any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity,
and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." 18
U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1994).
34. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
35. See id. at 593.
86. See id. at 579.
87. See id. at 578-79. The enterprise was described as "a group of individuals
associated in fact for the purpose of illegally trafficking in narcotics and other dangerous
drugs." Id. at 579.
88. See id. at 579-80.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 577.
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statute would result in an "incongruous position."9' Given the broad
construction of the statute and the intent of Congress, the Court found
the additional requirement of a legitimate enterprise unnecessary.92
In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,93 the Supreme Court reiterated its
decision in Turkette and gave civil RICO an equally broad
interpretation.94 The majority concluded that since "[t]he language of
RICO gives no obvious indication that a civil action can proceed only
after a criminal conviction," the trend of the lower courts to limit
RICO's scope should be terminated.95 Specifically, the Court eliminated
the requirement that civil RICO could be violated only by a person
involved in organized crime.96 The rationale was that section 1962 is
broadly targeted at "'any person'-not just mobsters."97 However, the
Court recognized that "in its private civil version, RICO is evolving into
something quite different from the original conception of its enactors.""8
The Sedima majority requested that Congress amend RICO to better
align it with the legislation's original intent." However, Congress has
largely ignored this request." In a stinging dissent, Justice Powell
warned that "[t]oday's opinion inevitably will encourage continued
expansion of resort to RICO in cases of alleged fraud or contract
violation rather than to the traditional remedies available in state
court.... [l]t defies rational belief, particularly in light of the legislative
history, that Congress intended this far-reaching result.''. As the
number of civil RICO cases continues to grow, the fears of the
dissenting Justices are being realized.
Other requirements have been imposed on the enterprise prong of
91. Id. at 587.
92. See id. at 589-93.
93. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
94. See id. at 488. In this case, Sedima and Imrex entered into a joint venture
where the buyer would order parts through Sedima and Inrex would supply them. See
id. at 483-84. Convinced that Imrex was illegally inflating the bills to cheat them out of
proceeds, Sedima filed suit for RICO violations in the Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of New York. See id at 484.
95. Id. at 488 (dismissing the Second Circuit's added requirement that a civil
RICO suit can proceed only after a criminal conviction).
96. See id. at 492.
97. Id. at 495.
98. Id. at 500.
99. See id.
100. See RAKOFF & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 41, at 1-7 (discussing Congress's failure
to meaningfully amend RICO).
101. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 530 (Powell, J., dissenting).
RICO. Lower courts debated whether the requirement of an economic
motive is necessary for a successful claim. Prior to 1994, RICO was
interpreted to apply solely to organizations in operation for economic
motives. This requirement was abolished by the decision in National
Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler.04 The plaintiff, a women's
rights organization, alleged the defendants belonged to a coalition of
antiabortion groups that planned to illegally shut down abortion
clinics.' 3 The plaintiff claimed that members of the antiabortion group
committed predicate acts under RICO in their quest to shut down
abortion clinics. 4 These actions both injured and violated a property
interest of the clinics' business. °" The district court dismissed the case
for failure to state a claim and the Supreme Court reviewed the validity
of this decision.'2 6
The Court held that according to the statutory construction of RICO,
no economic motive is required for a successful RICO claim.04 The
Court pointed out that "[n]owhere in either [section] 1962(c) or the
RICO definitions in [section] 1961 is there any indication that an
economic motive is required."'0' This decision marked the abandonment
of efforts by lower courts and litigators to impede the reach of RICO.
With the removal of this requirement, RICO's scope is broader than
ever.
Courts have also struggled with how an enterprise must be structured
to fall within the ambit of the Act. The dichotomy between enterprise
and person has been particularly troublesome."°  To bring forth a
successful claim, the enterprise must be a separate entity from the RICO
defendant. This is difficult to do, considering the Supreme Court's
102. 510 U.S. 249 (1994). For a more detailed look at the impact of this case, see
generally Bryan W. Riley, Note, RICO-Economic Motive Unnecessary for the Proof of
an Enterprise: National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798
(1994), 17 U. ARK. LrrrLEROCKL.J. 343 (1995).
103. See Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 252-54. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants were
members of "a coalition of antiabortion groups called the Pro-Life Action Network
(PLAN) ... and other individuals," id. at 252, who were part "of a nationwide
conspiracy to shut down abortion clinics through a pattern of racketeering activity." Id.
at 253.
104. See id. at 252-53. Petitioner alleged that respondents engaged in actions such
as extortion in violation of RICO. See id. Additionally, they alleged that the anti-
abortion group "conspired to use threatened or actual force, violence, or fear to induce
clinic employees, doctors, and patients to give up their jobs, give up their economic right
to practice medicine, and give up their right to obtain medical services at the clinics." Id.
105. See id. at 253-54.
106. See id. at 254.
107. See id. at 261.
108. Id. at 257. The Court stated that "the statutory language is unambiguous" and
that it cannot be construed otherwise to include an economic motive requirement. Id. at
261.
109. See BATISTA, supra note 41, at 114.
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limited and complex guidelines set forth in Turkette."° The Turkette
Court noted that while the pattern of racketeering must be proved by
evidence illustrating the appropriate number of predicate acts, the
enterprise element can be inferred from showing that these acts
"function as a continuing unit.' This explanation did little to help
future courts distinguish the element of enterprise from the pattern.
The dilemma of separating the enterprise from the entity performing
the predicate act has not yet been settled.' To clarify the guidelines set
forth in Turkette, various circuits have created their own standards. The
majority of courts, and the Second and Eleventh Circuits in particular,
find that proof of an enterprise shows the existence of a pattern."' This
perspective is supported by dicta in Turkette that notes that proof of
pattern and proof of enterprise may sometimes "coalesce.' The
minority position prefers a more narrow construction of the statute and
requires a separate showing of the pattern and the enterprise."5
In United States v. Bledsoe,"6 the Eighth Circuit created a three-prong
test to determine if the enterprise element of RICO is met."7 This view
rejected the holding of other courts that any alliance of two people
constitutes an enterprise. Following Turkette, the court in Bledsoe
required that the enterprise have both: (1) a "common... purpose ' "' (2)
which "'function[s] as a continuing unit'....., and (3) an "ascertainable
structure" that differs from "that inherent in the conduct of a pattern of
110. See BATISTA, supra note 41, at 116. In Turkette, the Court held that both
legitimate and illegitimate activities constitute enterprises. See Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,
583 (1981).
111. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 93-101.
113. See BATISTA, supra note 41, at 117.
114. 452 U.S. at 583; see Gail A. Feichtinger, Note, RICO's Enterprise Element:
Redefining or Paraphrasing to Death?, 22WM. MrrcHiELLL. REv. 1027, 1036-37 (1996)
(discussing the application of Turkette).
115. See Feichtinger, supra note 114, at 1038.
116. 674 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. United States v. Phillips,
459 U.S. 1040 (1982).
117. See id. at 665-66.
118. Id. at 665.
119. Id. at 665 (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 582 (1981))
(emphasis omitted). The court found that the distinguishing characteristic of a RICO
enterprise is that "there is some continuity of both structure and personality." Ia This
means that the people who run an enterprise may change as long as the "various roles
which the old and new individuals perform remain the same. But if an entirely new set
of people begin to operate the ring, it is not the same enterprise as it was before." Ia
racketeering activity."'"
The view of the Eighth Circuit was followed by the Third Circuit in
United States v Riccobene.' The Fourth Circuit also follows this view,
although generally finding the existence of an independent enterprise.'"
This confusion among the circuits illustrates the need for legislative
action to clarify the requirements of the statute.
2. Pattern of Racketeering Activity
Another point of great conflict in RICO is the language in section
1962(c). RICO requires that a pattern of predicate acts affect an
enterprise. However, section 1962(c) states that these provisions only
apply to "any person employed or associated with any enterprise."' 1 A
"person" is defined by section 1961(3) as "any individual or entity
capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property."' 4 This
language has led the majority of courts to conclude that a person and
entity must be separate and distinct from each other." However, the
circuits remain divided on this issue as well.
RICO requires the existence of a pattern of racketeering activity that is
founded on "at least two acts of racketeering activity."" The statute
lists nine state offenses and more than thirty federal offenses as
racketeering activity." The variety of federal offenses listed as
predicate offenses illustrates the expansiveness of RICO.' Included in
the offenses listed are mail and wire fraud, obstruction of justice, and
120. Id.
121. 709 F.2d 214, 223-24 (3d Cir. 1983) cert. denied sub nom. Ciancaglini v.
United States, 464 U.S. 849 (1983).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 660 F.2d 996, 998 (4th Cir. 1981) (analyzing
the existence of an associated-in-fact enterprise for a criminal defendant). The court in
Griffln followed the logic from Turkette and found that the defendant's enterprise
fulfilled the requirements of RICO even though it was created solely for the purpose of
carrying forth an illegitimate scheme. See id at 998; see also United States v. Gray, 137
F.3d 765, 772 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding that there was sufficient evidence to prove that the
enterprise existed separate and apart from the association).
123. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1994).
124. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1994).
125. See RAKOFF & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 41, at 1-57. The majority view is stated
in Haroco, Ic. v. American National Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 402 (7th Cir.
1984) (holding that section 1962(c) requires the person and enterprise to be separate for a
RICO violation).
126. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1994).
127. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (Supp. IV 1998). The state offenses include murder,
kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or
dealing in narcotics. The statute further requires that the state offense is punishable
under state law by imprisonment of more than one year. See id.
128. These offenses are listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). The definition lists both the
statutory number of the offense and a brief discussion of the illicit conduct. See id.
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certain drug offenses.' 29 For RICO violations based on state offenses, it
is not necessary that the state crime be titled exactly as the statute
defines.' 30 Procedural problems that may bar the state claim from being
brought will not hinder a federal suit alleging RICO.
The Supreme Court has attempted to clarify the necessary elements of
a pattern. In H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,'3' the
Supreme Court determined that the pattern of racketeering element of
RICO required both a relationship and continuity of the predicate acts. '32
This test is referred to as the "continuity plus relationship" test.'33
Continuity can be achieved by proving either that the acts occurred over
a substantial amount of time or that the acts demonstrated a threat of
continued racketeering activity." If a predicate act lasts only a few
weeks and creates no fear of future criminal activity, the requisite pattern
is not established. However, in the case of a predicate act that lasts a
few weeks but evidences a "specific threat of repetition extending
indefinitely into the future" the continuity requirement is satisfied.'35
The Court recognized that whether or not a pattern exists will depend
on the facts of the case.36 In H.J., Inc., the Court acknowledged that it
was impossible for it to clearly define the specific requirements
necessary for a pattern of racketeering activity to exist under RICO.'37
The Court stated that future cases would further clarify the test, unless
Congress "revisit[ed] RICO to provide clearer guidance as to the Act's
intended scope."'38
Even with the guidelines set by the Court in H.J., Inc., appellate courts
disagreed over what specific facts would constitute a pattern under
RICO.'39 Furthermore, lower courts have come to different conclusions
129. See id.
130. For example, in United States v. Garner, 837 F.2d 1404 (7th Cir. 1987), the
court held that violation of the Illinois official misconduct statute fits the general
definition of bribery and therefore fulfilled the requirement of a predicate act under
RICO. See id. at 1418.
131. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
132. See id. at 239.
133. See, e.g., Corley v. Rosewood Care Ctr., Inc., 142 F.3d 1041, 1048 (7th Cir.
1998) (discussing H.J., Inc.'s "continuity plus relationship" test).
134. See H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. at 242.
135. Id.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 243.
138. Id.
139. See Feinstein v. Resolution Trust Corp., 942 F.2d 34, 44 (lst Cir. 1991)
(finding that an allegation of a single scheme may be sufficient to establish a
about the specific requirements of the "continuity plus relationship"
test.'4° Neither the Supreme Court nor Congress has clarified the
qualifications of this test, further evidencing the need for reform of
RICO.
3. Abstention
RICO claims may also bring up questions of abstention.14" ' The
Supreme Court has accepted that in some cases properly before the
federal courts, the federal system should defer to the state courts as a
matter of policy.142 One situation in which abstention is appropriate is
when it is used to defer to complicated state administrative procedures.'43
Federal courts can abstain for this reason by using the Burford
abstention doctrine. 44 Burford abstention is used in RICO cases when a
complex state administrative scheme exists to properly address the
matter.
Federal courts can also abstain due to the presence of concurrent state
proceedings. 4S The Supreme Court discussed this type of abstention in
relationship). But see Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1535 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that a single episode does not meet the necessary relationship under RICO).
140. The First Circuit and the Third Circuit have been lenient regarding the
relationship prong. See Feinstein, 942 F.2d at 44; United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d
553, 565 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that one act of collecting unlawful debt is necessary to
establish predicate acts and the relationship requirement of RICO is necessary to prevent
RICO from being used against a series of unconnected acts). The Second Circuit has
stated that proof of two acts of racketeering activity is not, in itself, sufficient to create a
pattern. See United States v. Coiro, 922 F.2d 1008, 1017 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating a RICO
pattern requires proof of multiple racketeering predicate acts); United States v. Long,
917 F.2d 691, 697 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting the government must prove two racketeering
acts related to each other). However, the Eighth Circuit has stated that what constitutes a
pattern is a question of fact. See Diamonds Plus, Inc. v. Kolber, 960 F.2d 765, 769 (8th
Cir. 1992).
141. Abstention is a means by which federal courts, due to compelling state
interests, defer to state courts even though diversity jurisdiction is proper. See ERWIN
CHEMERiNSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICnON 735-834 (3d ed. 1999).
142. See Lisa Pritchard Bailey et al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations, 36 AM. CRim. L. REv. 1035, 1067 (1999).
143. See CHEMERiNsKY, supra note 141, at 754.
144. See id. This doctrine is named for the landmark case Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,
319 U.S. 315 (1943). Sun Oil brought an action in federal district court attacking an
order by the Texas Railroad Commission that granted Burford a permit to drill oil wells
in an oil field in East Texas. See id, at 316-17. Though diversity jurisdiction was
proper, the Supreme Court felt that the federal district court should have dismissed the
case based on unclear state law and the presence of a complex state administrative
scheme. See id. at 327-28, 331. When Burford abstention is used, the federal district
court should dismiss the case. See id. at 334.
145. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 141, at 813-34 (discussing the problem of
duplicative litigation and abstention as a solution).
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Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States.' In that
case, the Court held that a federal court can abstain because of the
presence of a concurrent state court claim only when there are
"exceptional circumstances." 47
Abstention can have serious implications for plaintiffs in RICO suits.
Even if all of the elements of a RICO violation are present, the court can
abstain from deciding the case merely because it implicates a matter for
which there is a complex administrative scheme. Divorce is an area
where states have created advanced procedures, and state courts are
better able to understand the state procedure than a federal court.
Additionally, if the divorce is ongoing, Colorado River abstention will
be appropriate. Abstention can be properly applied to RICO cases where
federal jurisdiction would otherwise be appropriate.'
1
However, the lower courts' attitudes toward using Burford abstention
in divorce cases have recently changed. This likely stems from the
Supreme Court decision in New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council
of the City of New Orleans.49 The Court determined that federal courts
should use Burford abstention only when there are "'difficult questions
of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import
whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar"' or when
the "'exercise of federal review of the question in a case and in similar
cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent
policy.'
1 50
Another case that affected federal courts' willingness to abstain on
Burford grounds is Ankenbrandt v. Richards.'51 In Ankenbrandt the
Supreme Court analyzed the domestic relations exception to federal
diversity jurisdiction.152 The Court held that this exception only applies
146. 424 U.S. 800 (1976). In this case, the United States brought an action in
federal court, with more than 1000 defendants named, seeking a declaration of water
rights. See id. at 805. One defendant filed a motion in state court concerning the same
water rights. See id. at 806. The Supreme Court recognized that only under exceptional
circumstances may a federal court abstain to avoid duplicate state litigation. See id. at
818.
147. See id. There remains confusion in the circuits regarding when the requisite
"exceptional circumstances" exist for abstention to be appropriate. See CHDSEN5KY,
supra note 141, at 822.
148. The unique application of abstention in RICO cases in the divorce arena will
be further discussed infra Part Ill.B.1.
149. 491 U.S. 350 (1989).
150. Id. at 361 (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814).
151. 504 U.S. 689 (1992).
152. See id. at 700-01.
to domestic situations that seek the granting of a divorce or alimony
decree.' The Court went on to analyze the appropriateness of Burford
abstention in domestic relations cases. The Court determined that when
the status of the domestic relationship is settled under state law (i.e., the
divorce is final), and does not affect the underlying torts alleged,
Burford abstention is not appropriate. m This holding cautions federal
courts against using Burford abstention in all domestic relations cases.'55
The numerous problems associated with a RICO suit illustrate the
need for reform. Though litigators and courts have continuously
struggled with RICO, Congress has ignored their pleas to rewrite the
statute. 56 Failed attempts at improvement, coupled with the far-reaching
congressional mandate of RICO, force one to assume that Congress
accepts the extraordinary applications of civil RICO and that current use
of RICO is in line with Congressional intent. As RICO becomes even
more expansive, numerous possibilities for its use arise. Though
RICO's application in the divorce context may seem like an absurd use
of the statute, it is actually an apt use-given the trend.
III. UNIQUE USES OF RICO: MOVING INTO THE DIVORCE ARENA
This section looks at prior nontraditional uses of RICO, illustrating
how RICO allegations have been pled in the divorce arena. Given prior
unique applications of RICO, divorce is a natural extension of the
statute's reach. Though most plaintiffs using RICO in divorce have
been unsuccessful, it is possible for a RICO action to be successfully
litigated in this area of law.
A. Prior Attempts
The far-reaching application of RICO is evidenced by the wide variety
of cases alleging RICO violations. RICO has been used in situations
ranging from assertions against tobacco companies' to challenging the
distribution of an estate."' Due to the broad application of RICO, it is
153. See id. at 701-02.
154. See id. at 705-06.
155. See id. at 701-02.
156. For example, in Sedima S.P.R.L v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984),
rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985), the court listed specific problems with RICO and called for
legislative change. See id. at 500. Also, in H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone
Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1980), the Court noted that "RICO may be a poorly drafted statute;
but rewriting it is a job for Congress, if it is so inclined, and not for this Court." Id. at
249.
157. See infra text accompanying notes 160-63.
158. See Tabas v. Tabas, 47 F.3d 1280 (3d Cir. 1995); infra text accompanying
notes 169-72.
560
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only natural that plaintiffs in divorce litigation are testing the statute.
1. Other Nontraditional Uses of RICO
With its broad language and potential for large payout, divorce is not
the only nontraditional use of civil RICO. 59 Recently, the government
filed a massive lawsuit alleging civil RICO violations against the
country's largest tobacco companies 60 In a 131-page complaint, the
government asserted that cigarette companies and their public relations
and research departments have engaged in a conspiracy for almost half a
century to mislead, defraud, and lie to citizens about the harmful effects
of smoking and tobacco's addictive qualities.' 6' The government sought
reimbursement for money spent treating people with cigarette-related
diseases and also sought crucial changes in industry behavior.1 62  A
tobacco spokesperson asserted that this claim has no "'valid basis in fact
or law.""
3
There seems to be no end to applications of civil RICO. A disgruntled
employer asserted RICO claims against a former employee for a breach
of contract. 64 A professional hockey player employed RICO when he
was unhappy with bargaining done by the hockey league and the player
union's executive director.' In the area of family law, lawyers are also
finding creative applications of RICO. For example, in Strain v.
159. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986).
In this case, a Church of Scientology brought a RICO claim against another church
alleging theft of spiritual items. See id. at 1077.
160. See Alissa J. Rubin et al., Cigarette Makers Denounce Suit as Official
Hypocrisy, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1999, at Al.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. Alissa . Rubin, U.S. to File Suit Against Tobacco Firms, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22,
1999, at All (quoting tobacco spokesperson Mike York).
164. See Saine v. National Health Ins. Co., 582 F. Supp. 1299, 1302 (D. Colo.
1984). In this case, an employer counterclaimed when the defendant alleged that it had
not paid him his commissions with RICO allegations for breach of contract. The
defendant asserted that the plaintiff entered into negotiations with a competitor (in
violation of contract) and that the third party defendant company had entered into an
illicit scheme involving fraudulent representations against him. See id. These
allegations were dismissed due to improper pleading. See id. at 1310.
165. See Forbes v. Eagleson, 19 F. Supp. 2d 352, 355 (E.D. Pa. 1998). In this case,
a former professional hockey player alleged RICO violations against the league for
collusive, quid pro quo arrangements between the league defendants and the player
union's executive director. See id. at 355. RICO allegations were barred by the statute
of limitations. See id. at 377.
Kaufman County District Attorney's Office,"6 a father and grandmother
of a minor child who were subject to both criminal and civil proceedings
for alleged child abuse brought RICO charges against state and county
departments and officials. '67 The court found that the plaintiff's RICO
allegations lacked merit for failure to plead a pattern of racketeering
activity.
63
This creatively used statute has also been used to contest distribution
of an estate.'6 When Charles Tabas died, the income from the
partnership he and his brother formed was to be split between his brother
and his estate. 70 The plaintiff estate alleged that Tabas's brother
continuously and falsely represented the partnership's worth to the estate
and diverted funds from the partnership for his own personal expenses.'
This case withstood summary judgment and is an apt example of
nontraditional use of RICO.
172
In a case heard by the Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit, Calcasieu
Marine National Bank v. Grant,'7 a former wife brought an action
against her former husband asserting unfair trade practices, fraud,
negligence, and tort claims. 4 This case failed on the merits,' 75 but it was
not barred by policy reasons. Similarly, in a case heard by the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Grimmett v. Brown,176 a former wife
brought RICO allegations against her ex-husband's bankruptcy estate.
Her RICO claim was based on his attorney's actions to conceal her ex-
husband's stake in a medical practice to defeat her community property
interest.' The court dismissed this case as barred by the applicable
statute of limitations, but it did not reject it on policy grounds.'79
2. Policy Considerations for RICO Applied in Divorce
Considering the great variety of cases that use civil RICO, and the
courts' acceptance of such claims, RICO's debut in the field of divorce
166. 23 F. Supp. 2d 685 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
167. See id. at 688. In this case, accusations of physical abuse led to civil and
criminal proceedings that were eventually resolved through mediation. See id. at 689.
168. See id. at 695.
169. See Tabas v. Tabas, 47 F.3d 1280 (3d Cir. 1995).
170. See id. at 1282.
171. See id. at 1286.
172. See id. at 1281 (reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment and
remanding for further proceedings).
173. 943 F.2d 1453 (5th Cir. 1991).
174. See id. at 1455.
175. See id. at 1455-56.
176. 75 F.3d 506 (9th Cir. 1996).
177. See id. at 508.
178. See id. at 509.
179. See id. at 517.
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is no surprise. RICO has been properly applied in the field of family law
and divorce is merely a subset of this type of law. The nontraditional
use of RICO sets the stage for new and innovative uses.
The judge in Perlberger'8 recognized this when Mrs. Perlberger
brought her RICO allegations against her errant ex-husband."' In a
motion to dismiss during litigation, the judge was unpersuaded by the
defendant's argument that RICO "was not enacted to provide a [flederal
forum to an individual dissatisfied with a divorce decree."'" The judge
refused to dismiss Mrs. Perlberger's claims on policy grounds. The
court noted that civil RICO's "broad sweep ... has been the subject of
much debate and criticism by commentators and jurists alike. ' 3
Despite the criticism surrounding the statute, the court found that case
law supported RICO claims that are based on acts outside of the range of
organized crime.' 4
The defendants in Perlberger further asserted that since RICO had not
ever been used to contest a divorce decree-or even to attack a child
support order or alimony award-the court should not extend RICO to
this new area of law.'85 Though the defendants correctly stated that no
Pennsylvania cases had used RICO in this way, the court looked to other
civil RICO claims that relate to family law issues.
Specifically, the court in Perlberger was persuaded by the willingness
of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits to hear cases that used RICO in family
law matters."6 The court recognized the holding from Tabas, which
found that even if the alleged illicit scheme can be described as "garden
variety fraud," it is not lethal to the RICO claim.'" Based on this case,
and prior cases tolerating RICO's use in family law cases, the court
180. For an introductory discussion of the Perlberger litigation, including the six
decisions to date, see supra notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
181. See Perlberger v. Perlberger (Perlberger II), No. CIV.A.97-4105, 1998 WL





186. See Perlberger II, 1998 WL 76310, at *4. The court was persuaded by the
willingness of the Fifth Circuit, in Calcasieu Marine National Bank v. Grant, 943 F.2d
1453 (5th Cir. 1991), and the Ninth Circuit, in Grimmett v. Brown, 75 F.3d 506 (9th Cir.
1996), to hear civil RICO claims dealing with family law issues. See Perlberger I, 1998
WL 76310, at *4. These cases were not barred by policy reasons and are discussed infra
Part III.B.
187. Tabas v. Tabas, 47 F.3d 1280, 1290 (3d Cir. 1995); see supra text
accompanying notes 169-72.
found that policy reasons did not preclude Mrs. Perlberger's action from
proceeding.'88 Other cases using RICO in the divorce context have not
been able to properly plead all elements under RICO as the plaintiff did
in Perlberger.89
B. Why Past RICO Cases in Divorce Have Failed
Creative litigators have attempted to use RICO in the divorce arena.
However, prior cases have failed for seven reasons: (1) abstention was
appropriate;"' (2) the action was res judicata to state proceedings; 1' (3)
failure to plead facts to sufficiently illustrate predicate acts;'9 (4) failure
to show a pattern of racketeering activity;' 9 (5) failure to prove that
defendants conducted an enterprise;'" (6) failure to show that plaintiffs
were injured in their business or property;195 and (7) the action was
barred by the statute of limitations.'96 To completely understand how
these RICO allegations have failed on the divorce battlefield, it is
necessary to look at the specific facts of the cases.
1. Abstention and Res Judicata
A case in the divorce forum that failed due to abstention is DuBroffv.
DuBroff97 In DuBroff, an ex-wife brought RICO violations against her
ex-husband, his business associates, and lawyers due to alleged fraud
during divorce proceedings.'98 Mrs. DuBroff alleged mail, wire, and
188. See Perlberger l, 1998 WL76310, at*4.
189. See id. at *5-7.
190. See DuBroff v. DuBroff, 833 F.2d 557, 561 (5th Cir. 1987); Dibbs v.
Gonsalves, 921 F. Supp. 44, 51 (D.P.R. 1996); infra Part ll.B.1.
191. See Evans v. Dale, 896 F.2d 975, 978 (5th Cir. 1990); infra Part III.B.1.
192. See Streck v. Peters, 855 F. Supp. 1156, 1164 (D. Haw. 1994); Smith v.
Johnston, 173 F.3d 430, No. 98-1034, 1999 WL 137619, at *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 5, 1999)
(unpublished table decision); infra Part III.B.2.
193. See Hibbard v. Benjamin, No. Civ.A.90-10361-WF, 1992 WL 300838, at *3
(D. Mass. Sept. 21, 1992); Streck, 855 F. Supp. at 1166; infra Part III.B.2.
194. See Reynolds v. Condon, 908 F. Supp 1494, 1512 (N.D. Iowa 1996); infra Part
III.B.3.
195. See DeMauro v. DeMauro, 115 F.3d 94, 98-99 (1st Cir. 1997); Capasso v.
Cigna Ins. Co., 765 F. Supp. 839, 841-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); infra Part HLI.B.4.
196. In Grimmett v. Brown, 75 F.3d 506 (9th Cir. 1996), an ex-wife's RICO
allegations were barred by the four-year statute of limitations. See id at 508. Joanne
Siragusa and Tom Grimmett, the bankruptcy trustee of Joanne's ex-husband's estate,
brought RICO allegations against the ex-husband's attorney. See id. The plaintiffs
alleged that Ms. Brown masterminded a fraudulent scheme to conceal her ex-husband's
property interest, which resulted in a smaller settlement. See id. Though this case was
brought against an attorney, it represents an important point: if the four-year statute of
limitations has run, the case will be dismissed without a decision on the merits.
197. 833 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1987).
198. See id. at 557.
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state-law fraud as predicate acts.' She settled with all defendants
except her ex-husband's lawyers.2°° This case displayed state law
problems because the alleged racketeering activity took place while
divorce proceedings ensued."' Additionally, the court in DuBroff based
its holding on the view that "there is perhaps no state administrative
scheme in which federal court intrusions are less appropriate than
domestic relations law." Abstention was found appropriate because of
the "novel and dubious questions of state family law."2'
The Court in DuBroff discussed two reasons why judges in divorce
cases using RICO abstain in favor of state courts:1 (1) the possibility of
a state procedure available to challenge the divorce action due to fraud,
and (2) the general tendency of federal courts to allow state courts to
deal with divorce actions due to their greater understanding of the state
system. 5
The primary reason the court abstained in DuBroff was that it was
unclear whether a state procedure could be utilized to challenge the
divorce settlement. This confusion exists because some states have an
independent action for fraud, while in other states there is statutory
authority for opening up divorce judgments based on hidden assets.2 0 If
such a state procedure exists, then a state administrative system would
be compromised if the federal court proceeded with the RICO
allegations. The second reason that the DuBroff court abstained is that
199. See id. at 558.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. Id. at 561.
203. Id. at 562.
204. See id. at 561-62. The court stated that it was unclear whether the Texas state
court would "allow an independent action for fraud and conspiracy in the property
settlement." Id. at 562. Relying on Colorado River Water and the Burford abstention
doctrine, the court found that to hear the case would be disruptive to the state
administrative scheme. See id. at 561-62.
205. See id.
206. Prior to the decision in Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992), the
federal circuit courts had frequently deferred to state courts in cases involving
application of the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction based on diversity.
See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547, 1558 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing cases in
support of the contention that federal courts decline to hear disputes that would deeply
involve them in domestic matters); Ingram v. Hayes, 866 F.2d 368, 370 (11th Cir. 1988)
(holding that domestic relations exception applies to a tort action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress); Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1042-43 (D.C. Cir.
1982). The original authority for this stemmed from the Supreme Court decision in
Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582 (1859), which held that federal courts do not have
jurisdiction over suits for divorce or the allowance of alimony. See id. at 584.
federal courts have a general dislike of becoming involved in matters of
family law, specifically divorce cases.m The DuBroff court recognized
the strong administrative scheme in place at the state level to handle
divorce actions. 3  Tampering with the divorce action would be
disruptive to this state scheme.
However, the attitude of the court in DuBroff has changed and
subsequent courts have been less willing to use Burford abstention in
RICO actions.211 In Dibbs v. Gonsalves,2 1' an ex-wife brought suit
against her ex-husband under RICO based on a fraudulent scheme that
denied her marital assets.12 In a concurrent action, the parties were
undergoing litigation regarding community property in the local court.2 3
The case was defective on other grounds, but in dicta the judge noted
that if the case were successful on the merits, abstention would be
appropriate.214 To properly decide this case, it would be necessary for
the court to "disrupt the authority and rulings of the Puerto Rico
Superior Court in the liquidation of conjugal assets proceedings
which.., dealt with plaintiff['s] ... litigation abuse in that action."2,5
Since this case raised questions of family law, the court felt that to hear
it in federal court would undermine the local court's authority.
216
However, in Calcasieu Marine National Bank v. Grant1; the court
distinguished DuBroff. In Grant, a former wife brought RICO
allegations against her former husband, claiming he engaged in a
fraudulent scheme that resulted in an injury to a shared business
interest.218 The divorce action had terminated in its entirety.29 The court
207. See, e.g., Thompson, 798 F.2d at 1556 (recognizing that "domestic relations
questions... have traditionally and exclusively been reserved to state courts, which have
developed an expertise in such matters"); Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1021-22
(3d Cir. 1975) (stating that the federal courts are reluctant to hear cases about domestic
relations law since this is an area of state expertise); Magaziner v. Montemuro, 468 F.2d
782, 787 (3d Cir. 1972) (noting federal courts' reluctance to hear domestic relations
cases).
208. See DuBroff, 833 F.2d at 561-62.
209. See id.
210. See Bailey et al., supra note 142, at 1068.
211. 921 F. Supp. 44 (D.P.R. 1996).
212. See id. at 46-47.
213, See id. at 49.
214. See id. at 52.
215. Id.
216. See id.; see also Farkas v. D'Oca, 857 F. Supp. 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). In
Farkas, a wife brought RICO allegations against her husband's girlfriend alleging that
the girlfriend engaged in a fraudulent scheme to divert the wife's marital assets. See id.
at 301. The court held that it would abstain based on the wife's state divorce claim and
stay the RICO action. See id. at 303.
217. 943 F.2d 1453 (5th Cir. 1991).
218. See id. at 1456.
219. See id. at 1458.
[VOL. 37: 541, 2000] Civil RICO in Divorce
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
held that because the divorce action had concluded, the RICO action did
not implicate any state court issue of "child custody, alimony, visitation
rights, separation or divorce which could involve a federal court in such
state affairs."' Since the current action was a RICO violation with
pendent state claims of fraud and negligence, it did not implicate the
"domestic law snares" seen in DuBroff
21
In another case, Evans v. Dale,' the wife claimed RICO violations
occurred based on the misr presentation of stocks that were subject to
community property laws. These allegations were also dismissed
because they were precluded by res judicata to divorce proceedings.=4
In Dale the court questioned the DuBroff court's logic with respect to
abstention; the court stated that the analysis relied on a decision that was
later reversed by the Supreme Court.'
The shift in lower courts' attitudes is likely due to the Supreme Court
decisions in Ankenbrandt and New Orleans Public Service.226 Taken
together, these decisions make it less likely that federal courts win
abstain in civil RICO actions. However, neither the Supreme Court nor
Congress has definitively articulated when abstention in civil RICO suits
is appropriate.
2. Failure to Prove Predicate Acts and Establish a Pattern of
Racketeering Activity
Other cases have failed to establish predicate acts22 In Streck v.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. 896 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1990).
223. See id. at 976.
224. See id. at 978. The court noted that the DuBroff court's decision to abstain on
Burford grounds relied on the subsequently overruled case New Orleans Public Service
v. City of New Orleans, 798 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 491 U.S. 350 (1989). See
Evans, 896 F.2d at 978. The Court in Evans noted that "'[w]hile Burford is concerned
with protecting complex state administrative processes from undue federal interference,
it does not require abstention whenever there... is a "potential for conflict" with state
regulatory law or policy."' Id. at 979 (quoting New Orleans Public Service, 491 U.S. at
362 (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
815-16 (1976))). This reversal makes it unlikely that other courts will follow DuBroff.
225. See id. at 978. The Second and Eleventh Circuits also have been less willing
to abstain on Burford grounds since the DuBroff decision, largely due to the Supreme
Court's decision in New Orleans Public Service. See Bailey et al., supra note 142, at
1068.
226. For a detailed discussion of these cases, see supra Part II.C.3.
227. See Streck v. Peters, 855 F. Supp. 1156, 1164 (D. Haw. 1994); see also Smith
Peters,2 ' the plaintiff's allegations failed because his perjury and fraud
allegations did not constitute predicate acts under RICO.2 9 Additionally,
because all of the alleged predicate acts arose from one event, they failed
to constitute a pattern of racketeering under RICO.20
In Hibbard v. Benjamin,2' an ex-husband and minor child brought
RICO proceedings against an ex-wife for an alleged illicit scheme during
divorce that resulted in lessened alimony payments and child custody. 2"
This RICO claim failed because the plaintiff failed to show a pattern of
racketeering activity.23
3. Failure to Prove the Existence of an Enterprise
In Reynolds v. Condon2 an ex-husband brought a civil RICO action
against his former wife, her father, his ex-wife's attorney, and the
attorney's law firm for violations of RICO*25 Mr. Reynolds alleged that
his ex-wife extorted a favorable divorce settlement by threatening to
bring criminal action against him for sexually abusing a minor.' 6 The
court found that though the law firm met the requirement of an
enterprise under RICO, the plaintiff failed to show that the defendants
conducted the enterprise in a manner necessary for the RICO violation to
withstand summary judgment proceedings."
4. Failure to Prove Injury to Business or Property
Another reason divorce-related RICO actions have failed is an
inability to show injury to business or property.2s In DeMauro v.
v. Johnston, 173 F.3d 430, No. 98-1034, 1999 WL 137619, at *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 5, 1999)
(unpublished table decision) (holding that plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to
support his allegations that a conspiracy existed).
228. 855 F. Supp. 1156 (D. Haw. 1994).
229. See id. at 1162, 1164. The court noted that "[b]ad acts, alone, do not qualify as
predicate acts for RICO purposes; only those activities set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)
may serve as the basis for a RICO claim." Id. at 1162 (quoting Lewis v. Sporck, 612 F.
Supp. 1316, 1325 (N.D. Cal. 1985)).
230. See id. at 1166.
231. No. Civ.A.90-10361-WF, 1992 WL 300838 (D. Mass. Sept. 21,1992).
232. See id. at *1-2.
233. See id. at *3.
234. 908 F. Supp. 1494 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
235. See id. at 1498.
236. See id.
237. See id. at 1512; see also Calcasieu Marine Nat'l Bank v. Grant, 943 F.2d 1453,
1462 (5th Cir. 1991) (rejecting plaintiff's claim for failure to show the existence of an
enterprise with the requisite continuity).
238. See, e.g., DeMauro v. DeMauro, 115 F.3d 94, 98-99 (1st Cir. 1997); Capasso
v. Cigna Ins. Co., 765 F. Supp. 839, 841-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (upholding motion to
dismiss because former wife could not establish that her ex-husband's action was
calculated to damage her property).
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DeMauro,T9 Annette and Joseph DeMauro underwent a bitter divorce.2'
To add to the turbulence, Mr. DeMauro frequently failed to show up for
court and when present invoked his Fifth Amendment right to resist
discovery.? ' The court found Mr. DeMauro in contempt of court. 2
While divorce proceedings went forward, Mrs. DeMauro filed suit,
claiming RICO violations stemming from Mr. DeMauro's alleged
scheme to conceal separate and marital property during divorce.243 The
court found that Mrs. DeMauro's alleged interest in this property was
speculative because the property still belonged to her husband and her
actual award in a divorce settlement was unknown.2"
Though each of these RICO claims failed for one reason or another,
the underlying policy allowing RICO to be used in this context has not
been questioned. The court in Perlberger specifically addressed this
issue and found that public policy does not prevent RICO's use in the
divorce arena.245 Prior attempts, though unsuccessful, have set the stage
for valid RICO claims in this forum.
C. A Successful RICO Claim in Divorce
As previously mentioned, at least one court has decided not to reject a
RICO claim used in divorce proceedings on policy grounds.246 Though
most RICO allegations in the divorce context have not withstood
summary judgment, the reasons for the failures are primarily procedural
in nature.241 These cases do not pose impossible bars to a successful
claim. As an increasing number of ex-spouses use this litigation tool, it
is important to understand how a claim is successfully pled.
First, in order to prove a RICO violation, an injury to either plaintiff's
business or plaintiff's property must be shown.24  To fulfill this
requirement, an ex-spouse must prove that divorce proceedings were
undertaken in a manner that injured either his business or his property,
239. 115 F.3d 94 (1st Cir. 1997).




244. See id. at 98-99.
245. See Perlberger v. Perlberger (Perlberger II), No. CIV.A.97-4105, 1998 WL
76310, at *4. (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 1998).
246. See id. The court's analysis is discussed supra Part II.A.2.
247. See supra Part IL.B.
248. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
or both. In the divorce context, this can be done by demonstrating that
the defendant conducted a fraudulent scheme that decreased the divorce
settlement. It is important that plaintiff alleges injury to an interest that
would certainly be awarded to her in divorce and not one that is purely
speculative. 49 Messody Perlberger fulfilled this RICO requirement by
alleging that her ex-husband decreased her potential alimony and child
support settlement by hiding his assets.' 0
Next, a plaintiff must show that the alleged injury arose while the
defendant acted as part of an enterprise. The Supreme Court held that
even illegitimate associations or entities fulfill the enterprise
requirement."' Therefore, a plaintiff may show that the enterprise in
question was created solely to further the defendant's illegitimate act of
hiding assets to minimize divorce settlement. 2 In the divorce context a
plaintiff will likely allege that the enterprise consisted of the defendant
and her lawyer, law firm, or perhaps a new love interest.2" In
Perlberger the enterprise-consisted of Mr. Perlberger and his law frm.2
The defendant in a RICO action also must have engaged in a pattern
of racketeering activity."s To fulfill this requirement, RICO lists a
variety of predicate acts in section 1961(1).26 For a valid RICO claim,
there must be either multiple violations of the same predicate act, or the
249. See DeMauro v. DeMauro, 115 F.3d 94 (1st Cir. 1997). The court dismissed
RICO allegations since "[n]o one knows what [plaintiff] will be awarded in the divorce
action." Id. at 97. Since her property interest was merely speculative, her RICO
allegations were invalid. See id.; see also discussion supra notes 239-44 and
accompanying text.
250. See Perlberger v. Perlberger (Perlberger 1), No. CIV.A.97-4105, 1997 WL
597955, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1997).
251. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 582 (1981); see also discussion
supra Part II.C.1.
252. See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 660 F.2d 996, 999 (4th Cir. 1982)
(discussing the application of Turkette to show that defendant's illegitimate enterprise
fulfilled the requirements of RICO).
253. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Condon, 908 F. Supp. 1494, 1512, (N.D. Iowa 1995)
(holding that a law firm is an enterprise under RICO); Handeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d
1339, 1349 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that appellant alleged facts to state a RICO claim
against a law firm); Napoli v. United States, 32 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding a law
firm properly comprised an enterprise); Tribune Co. v. Purcigliotti, 869 F. Supp. 1076,
1098 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that individual lawyers properly make up "the relevant
enterprises' affairs").
254. See Perlberger v. Perlberger (Perlberger fl), No. CIV.A.97-4105, 1998 WL
76310, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 1998) (holding that plaintiffs alleged a distinct
enterprise); Perlberger v. Perlberger (Perlberger VI), No. CIV.A.97-4105, 1999 WL
79503, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 1999).
255. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1994). This section gives a plaintiff the option of
proving either that defendant engaged in a "pattern of racketeering activity or collection
of unlawful debt." Id. Since "pattern of racketeering" is broader and easier to prove, the
vast majority of civil RICO claims use this provision. See ABRAMS, supra note 4, at 22.
256. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (Supp. IV 1998).
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commission of more than one predicate act. ' 7 The predicate act most
commonly used to bring forth a RICO claim in the divorce arena is mail
fraud23 A successful plaintiff must show that the alleged predicate acts
arose from more than one event to prove the pattern requirement.'
Though the pattern element is relatively straightforward, prior cases
have failed by neglecting to plead facts sufficient to support allegations
of predicate acts.
Even if all of the elements of a RICO violation are successfully pled, a
plaintiff still has one more major pitfall to avoid. If the case is res
judicata to state proceedings, or if the court stays the case due to
abstention, the plaintiff will be unable to plead her case. For example, in
one case charges were dismissed based on the federal court's desire to
abstain in favor of state courts.' If the issue involves a substantial state
interest, the court will be compelled to abstain. However, it is unlikely
that this will happen given the subsequent decline in courts' willingness
to abstain in RICO actions.262
Additionally, recent Supreme Court decisions 3 are helpful to
plaintiffs using civil RICO in divorce because they caution federal courts
against using Burford abstention in domestic relations cases.264  If
divorce proceedings have concluded and there is not a state procedure to
attack the divorce, the plaintiff's situation will be distinguishable from
DuBroff.26 However, plaintiffs must check on the law specific to the
state they are in to determine whether a state action exists to rectify the
situation. If the state law is clear and there is no confusion as to the lack
257. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
258. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1); DeMauro v. DeMauro, 115 F.3d 94, 95 (1st Cir.
1997) (alleging mail fraud as a predicate act); Perlberger II, 1998 WL 76310, at *1
(alleging RICO violations based on mail and wire fraud); Condon, 908 F. Supp. at 1500
(alleging that defendants "repeatedly caused letters and other matters and things to be
delivered by the United States Postal Service").
259. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1994).
260. See Smith v. Johnston, 173 F.3d 430, No. 98-1034, 1999 WL 137619 (6th Cir.
Mar. 5, 1999) (unpublished table decision).
261. See DuBroff v. DuBroff, 833 F.2d 557, 563 (5th Cir. 1987).
262. See Evans v. Dale, 896 F.2d 975, 978-79 (5th Cir. 1990); see also supra Part
lI1.B.1.
263. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992); New Orleans Pub. Serv. v.
City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989).
264. See Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 706 (holding that Burford abstention is not
appropriate in domestic cases when "the status of the domestic relationship has been
determined as a matter of state law, and.., has no bearing on the underlying torts
alleged").
265. See DuBroff, 833 F.2d at 562 & n.4.
of a potential state action to reopen divorce proceedings, the federal
court will not abstain. If plaintiff can overcome all other procedural
hurdles, such as meeting the statute of limitations, the case will be
properly heard in federal court.
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the continual expansion of various elements of RICO and the
broad congressional mandate evidenced in the statute, divorce is an apt
forum for civil RICO suits. One by one, requirements imposed by lower
courts were removed by the Supreme Court, thereby strengthening and
expanding the scope of RICO.266  Since its enactment, RICO's
application has crossed into almost all areas of the law, and new uses for
RICO are continually being explored.
As RICO becomes more commonly used in the field of family law,
there appears to be no limit to its potential reach. The courts' message is
clear: without action by Congress they will continue to uphold the broad
scope of RICO. Congress has refused to amend RICO in any way that
significantly changes this scope, even after a specific request by the U.S.
Supreme Court."7 With this history, there is no choice but to infer that
Congress agrees with the trend to use RICO in new and innovative ways.
Congress sends the message that it is sticking with its original goal to
make RICO broad, which is what makes it such a powerful litigation
tool.6
Courts have determined that RICO's application in family law is not
barred by policy. 9 This, coupled with judicial tolerance of RICO
allegations that consist of "garden variety" fraud claims, leaves no
barrier to RICO's use in cases such as Perlberger.20 Although divorce
may seem an absurd forum for this litigation tool, there is nothing in the
statute itself or in judicial commentary suggesting that this use is
impermissible. When looking over the necessary requirements for RICO
in a divorce-related action, a plausible set of facts exists to prove a case,
as illustrated by Messody Perlberger's cause of action. Major litigation
between spouses over settlements is becoming more common, and RICO
266. See supra Part I.C.
267. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985); see also supra
Part II.C. Perhaps Congress's refusal to amend RICO is based on the political
unattractiveness of appearing "soft on organized crime."
268. See 116 CONG. REc. 25,190 (1970) (reporting Senator John L. McClellan's
description of the treble damage provisions of RICO as "a major new tool in extirpating
the baneful influence of organized crime in our economic life").
269. See Perlberger v. Perlberger (Perlberger I1), No. CIV.A.97-4105, 1998 WL
76310, at *-4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 1998).
270. See supra Part III.A.2.
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is not the only tool being used in this fight.2" In these circumstances,
RICO is yet another way to further the conflict.
There is no end to potential uses of RICO. Though these uses of
RICO seem impossibly far from the congressional intent to fight
organized crime, with the current scope of RICO these new uses quite
possibly may flourish. Additionally, if the facts are there to support
RICO allegations, there is no reason that the courts should dismiss the
case on policy grounds. The message is clear: without statutory revision
RICO will continue to grow, and the courts are either unable or
unwilling to stop this growth.
It is unlikely that the original drafters of RICO predicted such far-
reaching use of the Act. The courts have recognized the problems they
are experiencing with the troublesome statute. However, Congress
either is satisfied with RICO's current application or feels that RICO
was intended to have such an expansive scope. Though technically a
correct use of the Act, this overuse of RICO is clogging the court system
and generating large damages awards where not really appropriate. As a
statute designed to stop Mafia infiltration, divorce is not really a proper
use of RICO. However, unless Congress takes an active role and re-
writes the statute, there is no end in sight to possible applications of
RICO. All that can be done now is to watch creative lawyers come up
with even more bizarre uses of RICO. Until Congress changes its
message, courts are compelled to comply.
ERIN ALEXANDER
271. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
574
